Quantitative Legislative and Compliance Research in the European Union
Research question/goal:
The primary goal of our project is to gain a systematic empirical perspective on European political integration and member state compliance over the last twenty-five years. Our contribution will entail the production of the single most complete and cross-validated data set covering Community legislation across all policy areas from its initiation through adoption, member state transposition, Commission enforcement and ECJ decision. We propose the combination of multiple online and print resources into a machine readable dataset covering member state preferences (derived from party manifestos), the initiation and adoption of Community legislation, the national transposition process of all member states, other domestic legislative activity of selected member states, the infringement proceedings initiated by Commission monitoring of member state transposition and finally the documented European Court of Justice proceedings and decisions. These data represent an invaluable asset to the greater scholarly community and will allow the project team to analyze several innovative aspects of legislative conflict, consensus, compliance and enforcement control.
Current stage:
Following the decision to integrate a national legislative focus into this project for submitting a proposal for funding to the German-Israel Foundation (GIF) in collaboration with the Hebrew University, which has been rejected, this project will be pursued in Ms. Luetgert’s postdoctoral research on the basis of a Margarete von Wrangell-Grant.
Publications
Journal Articles
Presentations
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(2008): Mixing Methods: A Nested Analysis of EU Member State Transposition Patterns. [ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Rennes, 10/04/2008 - 15/04/2008]. More
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(2008): Imputing Legislator's Missing Positions: A Strategic View. [Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Boston, Massachusetts, 27/08/2008 - 30/08/2008]. More
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(2008): Why do Member States waste their Time? Legislative Oversight in the EU Decision Making Process. [Conference on “Designing Democratic Institutions”, LSE, London, 12/05/2008 - 14/05/2008]. More
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(2008): Why do Veto Players waste their Time? Proposal Power and Legislative Oversight in the Decision Making Process of the European Union . [ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Rennes, 10/04/2008 - 15/04/2008]. More
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(2008): Why do Veto Players Waste their Time? Commissioners’ Proposal Power and Member States’ Scrutiny in EU Legislative Decision Making. [Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 02/04/2008 - 05/04/2008]. More
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(2008): Why do Veto players use their Power?. [The Political Economy of International Organizations, PEIO Conference, Ascona, 02/02/2008 - 07/02/2008]. More
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(2008): Policy Evaluation and Public Support for European Integration. [Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 02/04/2008 - 07/04/2008]. More
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(2007): Why don’t Veto players use their power?. [APPC Summer School, Turku School of Economics, 19/09/2007 - 21/09/2007]. More
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(2007): Why do veto players waste their time. [The Impact of Enlargement on the EU Institutions, Prague, 21/11/2007 - 22/11/2007]. More
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(2007): Is qualified Majority voting more effective. [Connex Workshop: New Modes of Governance, Sciences Po, 28/11/2007 - 28/11/2007]. More